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A FAVOR AT WHAT COST?
INTERFERENCE WITH EDUCATION
IS THE NEW IDNIGHT RAID
DAN RosINt
INTRODUCTION
The growth of the modern welfare State demands new approaches
from constitutional theorists struggling to protect the Bill of Rights.'
Before the New Deal State actively regulated economic benefits,
constitutional protections focused upon limiting coercive force or
criminal sanctions. 2 Accordingly, constitutional theory emphasized
the protection of negative rights against unilateral government action.3
t B.A., Brown University, 1992; J.D., University of Pemsylvania Law
School, 1997. The influence and dedication of Anya Read, Barbara Rosin and
Richard Rosin can never go unmentioned - thank you. My gratitude goes out to the
editors of this journal for their thoughtful attention.
1. Professor Charles A. Reich, in his influential article, The Nci PropeMrtv.
warns that "[wlhen government - national, state, or local - hands out something of
value, government's power grows forthwith; it automatically Vains such power as is
necessary and proper to supervise its largess. It obtains new rights to investigate,
to regulate, and to punish." Charles A. Reich, 7he Ncit, Property, 73 YALF L.J.
733, 746 (1964). One year earlier, Reich documented the coercive midnight raid
policies of many state welfare agencies. See Charles A. Reich, AMidni(qht Welfare
Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (19631. History regards
such policies as an affront to human dignity and to constitutional values. The
wisdom of state programs under the current welfare revolution has yet to be
determined.
For a general discussion of control gained by the government through
contracting, see Arthur S. Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A
Preliminarv, Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REv. 27 (1955). For a more SpeCific discussion of
control gained through the allocation of unemployment compensation, sce Note,
Charitv Versus Social Insurance in Unemployment Comnpcnsation Laws, 73 YALE L.J.
357 (1963).
2. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: 7he Problen of Negative Rights
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984).
3. Generally, "negative rights" refers to the individual's right to stop a state
or private actor from acting against her. The Fourth Amendment's right to be free
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In the modern State, such a theory has limited effect when the
government can encourage, or discipline, an individual towards a
preferred behavior as a bilateral condition for receipt of benefits.'
This Comment analyzes the social harm that may result when the
government, through its allocation of resources, forces the recipient
to abdicate certain constitutional rights. It presents the argument that
the Constitution does not solely provide negative rights, owned by the
individual; but instead, mandates particular relational rights, benefiting
the polity, that cannot be contracted away.' The major groundwork
for this analysis has been laid out in the rule against unconstitutional
conditions. Generally stated, the doctrine prohibits the State from
compelling an individual to surrender "one constitutional right as a
condition of its favor. 6 Although the rule is over sixty years old, it
of unlawful search and seizure is a paradigmatic example.
Professor Charles Fried defines a negative right as "the right not to be wronged
intentionally in some specified way; while a positive right is a claim to some
specified share of goods." CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110-112 (1978).
For further discussion of negative versus positive rights, see infra Part II.C.
4. Examples of such conditions influence behavior across a wide spectrum.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (upholding a requirement that interferes
with speech as a condition of government employment); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 103 U.S. 3017 (1983) (upholding a condition requiring a college to abdicate
a particular admissions policy as a prerequisite to tax-exempt status .id access to
student loans); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding the
requirement of an Amish employer to pay Social Security taxes despite religious
protests); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding interference with a
woman's right to choose an abortion while receiving restricted Medicaid funding)
(Brennan, J., dissenting, called Congress' allocation of funds "a deliberate effort to
discourage the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. ").
5. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 668-71 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968). Max Weber
has noted that "in no legal order is freedom of contract unlimited in fie sense that
the law would place its guaranty of coercion at the disposal of all and every
agreement regardless of its terms." Id. at 668.
6. See Frost & Frost Co. v. Chicago, M., 282 U.S. 311, 323-29 (1931);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Robert L. Hale,
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has too often been neglected.7  This Comment considers the
arguments awarding judicial deference and finds them wanting. The
object is to expand the scope of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
Part I discusses the constitutional impact resulting from one detail
of Pennsylvania's current welfare program: the "Up-Front" job search
requirement. The "Up-Front" requirement demands that all
Pennsylvania recipients of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC")8 program participate in a rigid state created
job-search which interferes with the individual's choice to pursue an
education. Part Il discusses and criticizes three doctrines of judicial
deference, inimical to the rule against unconstitutional conditions,
which approve the government's use of largess to interfere with
constitutional rights. Part III argues that some constitutional rights are
non-waivable, and therefore, the individual cannot freely enter into a
contract9 with the government and accept the allocation upon the
condition of a particular waiver. Part IV examines education as a
constitutional relational right and revisits Pennsylvania's "Up-Front"
program. Finally, this Comment concludes that education receives
some constitutional protection which the state cannot demand to be
waived.
I. PENNSYLVANIA'S WELFARE ALLOCATION -
STEERING RECIPIENTS AWAY FROM EDUCATION
On August 1, 1996, Congress called President Bill Clinton's bluff
and sent him a welfare reform bill that omitted the harsh Medicaid
cuts the President had previously opposed. Without the cover of these
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-18 (1991).
9. A "contract" is defined as "[an agreement between two or more persons
which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.... Its essentials
are competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement,
and mutuality of obligation." BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990). The
phrase "contract with the government" is not meant to imply that all of these
requirements are formally met. Rather, the phrase is used figuratively to describe
the individual and government's mutual obligation according to the terms of the
relevant statute.
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cuts, Clinton was forced to follow through with his 1992 election
promise to "end welfare as we know it." On August 22, 1996, he
signed Congress's Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act. 10
Section 401(b) of the Personal Responsibility Act provides: "This
part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to
assistance under any State program funded under this part." This
provision clearly repudiates the sixty-one year old social policy of
guaranteeing welfare benefits as an entitlement to anyone who meets
the requisite eligibility criteria.1 With the end of federal entitlement
status, the cooperative state-federal welfare system 2 has been
transmogrified. Replacing a system of federal requirements, block
grants are now allotted to each state, free of any specifications.
The current law in Pennsylvania, utilizing the federal block grant,
among other provisions, demands that each non-exempt AFDC
recipient participate in the Road to Economic Self-Sufficiency through
Employment and Training (RESET) program." RESET demands
that all participants seek, accept, and perform "work-related" activity
for at least twenty hours a week. 4 The initial phase of RESET
consists of the Up-Front job search program which must occur within
the first eight weeks of receiving benefits.' 5 If an applicant desires,
she may fulfill the work-related requirement, following the initial
eight-week Up-Front program, by participating in vocational
education, general education, English-as-a-second-language, or jobs
10. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcillatiori Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
11. The word "entitlement" may refer to either (1) the "entitlement doctrine"-
a judicial doctrine guiding the courts' interpretation of the amount of due process
protection awarded to public largess; or (2) an individual entitlement - If an
individual meets a given program's eligibility criteria, the state must provide the
relevant benefit independent of budgetary allocations.
12. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) ("The AFDC program Is
based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.").
13. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 405.1 (West 1996).
14. Id. § 405.1(a.2)(2).
15. Id. § 405.1(a.2)(3).
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skills training.16 Applying personal education to the work-related
requirement may be done for a maximum of twelve months. 7 If the
applicant has not received a high school diploma, and is between the
age of eighteen and twenty-two, he or she may fulfill the work-related
requirement by pursuing a Graduate Equivalence Degree ("GED") for
a maximum of twenty-four months. 8
Pennsylvania's Up-Front program forces the recipient of the
government allocation to abandon her pursuit of an education. Before
the new block grant system was signed into law, a state was precluded
by federal requirement from attaching any conditions to a welfare
benefit that interfered with the individual recipient's choice of a basic
education. 9
Under the present block-grant system, a state is free to demand
the waiver of a right whose waivability is highly questionable.
Currently, AFDC recipients are engaged in GED programs in an effort
to attain meaningful, long-lasting employment." The Up-Front
program, however, has forced women to drop out of their GED
programs in order to participate in the job search program. When the
16. Id. § 405.1(a.2)(5)
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The relevant statute reads in part:
If the State requires an individual who has attained the age of 20 years
and has not earned a high school diploma (or equivalent) to participate
in the program, the State agency shall include educational activities
consistent with his or her employment goals.... Any other services or
activities to which such a participant is assigned may not be permitted to
interfere with his or her participation in an appropriate educational
activity.
42 U.S. Code § 682(d)(2) (1996) (emphasis added).
The interpreting regulations put forth by the Department of Health and Human
Services clearly state that "[a] State's JOBS [Job Opportunity and Basic Skills)
program [the predecessor to RESET] must inclde ... (1) High school education or
education designed to prepare a person to qualify for a high school equivalenzy
certificate.. . . " 45 C.F.R. § 250.44(a)(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
20. One individual interviewed, indicative of the class, was enrolled in a GED
program in order to satisfy a prerequisite for entry to the Berean Institute, a
Philadelphia secretarial school. The Up-Front program forced her to drop out of her
GED class. Interview with Jane Doe in Philadelphia, Pa. (July, 1996).
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search yields a job at Burger King, the state forces the individual to
accept the employment or pursue the GED for a maxim'm of one
year. This one year cut-off comes too quickly for most women who
left school before the tenth grade. For them, it is, therefore, a choice
between flipping cheeseburgers or losing their benefits. The choice to
pursue a minimal education and apply it towards the work requirement
has effectively been removed.
II. DOCTRINES AWARDING JuDIcIAL DEFERENCE
21
A. The Greater Does Not Include the Lesser
The most dominant rationale justifying judicial deference to
allocational sanctions is "the greater includes the lesser." In 1876, the
Supreme Court held that a state could revoke a foreign corporation's
business license in retaliation for the corporation's invocation of
federal diversity jurisdiction.22  The dissent warned that such
retaliation would amount to an "unconstitutional condition" on the
right to do business.' The majority responded that "[i]f the State
has the power to cancel the license . . . [i]t has the power to
determine for what causes and in what manner the revocation shall be
made."24 The greater, therefore, includes the lesser.
This logic was most famously articulated in a number of dissents
by Justice Holmes. In 1910, Holmes forcefully argued that "[e]ven in
the law, the whole generally includes its parts. If the State may
prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition
in a certain way."'  If the government may deny the applicant
outright, the applicant suffers no more when the denial is due to a
failure to comply with the entitlement's specific condition. 6 Holmes
21. Many of the claims in this section, discussing doctrines of judicial
deference, benefit from the forceful arguments and examples provided by Professor
Seth Kreimer. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1304-26.
22. See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
23. Id. at 543 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 542.
25. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
26. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1306.
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stressed that "[t]he consequence is the measure of the condition.
When the only consequence of a breach is a result that the State may
bring about directly in the first place, the condition cannot be
unconstitutional."27
Such reasoning sustained government actions in various
constitutional areas until the final years of the Warren Court.
2
While the intuitive appeal of greater includes lesser analysis still
guides constitutional criminal doctrine, in most civil arenas it has been
abandoned.29 Justice Rehnquist, however, has been reluctant to fully
turn his back. In regard to due process protection, he stubbornly
insists that a plaintiff "must take the bitter with the sweet," and thus
accept whatever due process protections originally accompanied a
benefit.30 Concerning First Amendment protection, he has firmly
27. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. at 54 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1308. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (medical licensees); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (state university attendance); United States v. Maclntosh,
283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931) (naturalization); Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915)
(public works employment).
29. Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1308. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553 (1983) (greater power to require motorist to undergo brcathalyzer test
includes lesser power of using motorist's refusal as incriminating evidence against
defendant); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (greater authority to search a car
at moment of arrest justifies the lesser power of a warrantless search at police
station).
30. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion).
This approach appeared to command the weight of a majority in Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341 (1976) (refusing a claim for due process protection by a dismissed
government employee). This bitter and sweet reasoning was, however, quickly
repudiated in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 4S0, 491 (1980) (stating minimal
requirements of procedural due process are "a matter of federal law land) are not
diminished by the fact that the state may have specified its own procedures that it
may deem adequate . . . . "). This line of reasoning was solidified in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1982) (applying due process
requirements to government fair employment practices review).
For a detailed discussion and critique of the government's ability to defin
property rights and thus subsequently define the limits of due process protection, see
Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Priiikge Distinction in
Constitutional Law" The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAr4. L. REv. 69 (19S2);
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held that government as "proprietor" is distinct from government as
"sovereign," and the greater power to dispose of property inz.ludes the
lesser power to restrict its First Amendment uses.3' In regard to the
general distribution of public largess, he has held that "[w]hen the
government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is
entitled to define the limits on that program. ,32 Similarly, in regard
to corporate speech, Justice Rehnquist insists that because a
corporation exists at the grace of the state, the greater power granting
incorporation includes the lesser of prohibiting its speech. 3
In deference to Justice Rehnquist, even critics of "greater includes
lesser" logic have qualified their reproach. Professor Robert Hale, in
an article questioning the government's power to induce an individual
to contract away certain liberties, states that "this doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions . . . is difficult to support logically. If I
have no ground for complaint at being denied a privilege absolutely,
it is difficult to see how I acquire such a ground merely because the
state . . . offers me an alternative .... ,'
Such self-conscious hesitancy, however, is misplaced for two
reasons.35  First, constitutional analysis does not exclusively focus
Timothy P. Terrell, "Property, "Due Process," and the Distinction Between
Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982).
31. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (propriety ownership over mailboxes justifies exclusioll of
unstamped mail); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
125-26 (1977) (propriety ownership of prison allows the power to prohibit union
organizing); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 571 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State, no less than a private owner of property,
has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.") (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966)).
32. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (finding no First Amendment
conflict between a regulation prohibiting abortion counseling speech by an employee
at a Title X public health clinic).
33. See First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825-27 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
34. Hale, supra note 6, at 321-22. See also Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1310.
35. At the outset, it should be noted that the greater Includes die lesser
rationale is not a perfect syllogism. Professor Powell criticizes Justice Holmes'
claim that the power of total exclusion is a "whole," of which the power to impose
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upon consequences. When Justice Holmes explains judicial restraint
as "the consequence is the measure of the condition," he ignores that
constitutional protection is often awarded against the manner or
process in which the government attempts to achieve certain
consequences. The process must be restrained independent of the
consequences. For example, it is clear that the State may incarcerate
certain unlawful individuals. Such imprisonment is the consequence
the state desires. It is also a "greater" power than searching an
individual's home. However, such a search, without a warrant, has
been found to clearly violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 26 Indeed, most Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence restricts the process, or means, by which
the state may achieve the consequence of incarceration.
A second criticism of the "greater power includes the lesser"
attacks the assumption that the two powers can be qualitatively
compared. Professor Seth Kreimer insightfully points out that the
consequence of excluding African-Americans from a swimming pool
is entirely different from closing the pool to everyone. '  Applying
any burdens whatsoever, on those admitted, is a "part":
Major Premise: There is a class of corporations 'A" . . . over .vhich
the state has the power of absolute evclusion.
Minor Premise: The X corporation is an "A" corporation.
[false] Conclusion: Therefore, the X corporation is one upon which die
state has power to impose any burden whatsoever.
Plainly the only legitimate conclusion is that die X corporation is one
over which the state has the power of absolute exclusion .... [Justice
Holmes] has a different predicate in his conclusion from that in his major
premise .... The "power of absolute exclusion" is a term not identical
with "the power of relative exclusion" or Iwith] the "power to impose
any burden whatsoever."
Thomas R. Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 CoLUM. L. REv. 99, 110-11
(1916) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Agreeing with Professor Powell, Professor Kreimer writes that "laIll that can
be deduced logically from the power to deny a benefit absolutely is the power to
deny it absolutely. . . . If one does not accept the premise that the power of
conditional denial is an element of the power of absolute denial, then the former can
not be deduced from the latter." Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1310-11.
36. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (19S0).
37. Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1312.
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Holmes' argument that "the consequence is the measure of the
condition," in both cases African-Americans cannot swim. In the
former case, however, they suffer comparative injustice. Kreimer
states that "it seems clear that being denied an advantage granted to
others differs from being harmed in isolation."3 Indeed, much of
equal protection analysis turns on such a distinction between the power
to comparatively deny and the power to categorically deny. If a state,
for example, conducts a school board election, it cannot give the vote
to only those with a distinct interest in the schools. 3' Equal
protection analysis is not avoided because the state could have
categorically denied the right to vote.
The preceding criticisms of Holmes' argument give reason to
apply constitutional analysis to any government allocation. Realization
that (1) the Constitution demands scrutiny of a state's process to
achieve a consequence, and (2) respect for the reality that comparative
denial is significantly different from categorical denial, demand
renunciation of any legacy that the greater includes the lesser.
B. State As Proprietor Is Still The State
Another doctrine advocating judicial deference towards
government allocations is the fictitious distinction between the
government's proprietary and sovereign functions ° If constitutional
protection seeks to protect certain discreet liberties from majoritarian
interference, the sovereign-proprietor distinction urges lax judicial
review when such interference results from the government's use of
its property.
Justice Rehnquist has declared that "the role of government as
sovereign is subject to more stringent limitations than in its role of
38. Id.
39. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
40. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text, discussing Justice
Rebnquist's firm belief in the distinction between government as proprietor and
government as sovereign as justification for the adherence to greater ificludes tie
lesser logic - a proprietary interest inherently allows the proprietor the greater power
to shut-down, or deny all access to the property.
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government as employer, property owner or educator."4" Similarly,
Justice Powell has written:
There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law;
the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the
public interest is necessarily far broader.4 2
The relevance of the distinction made by Justices Rehnquist and
Powell has been urgently called into question. As Professor Kreimer
aptly points out, "[i]f one of the most effective means of social control
at the disposal of modern government is the allocation of benefits, then
[the] proprietary/sovereign distinction portends the disintegration of
constitutional review."4 - Surely, the government acting as proprietor
has equal power to limit individual liberty. One does not have to be
a vulgar legal economist' to recognize that fines and taxes will deter
behavior as readily as threats of incarceration.4" Likewise,
41. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 908-10 (19S2) (Relnquist, J.,
dissenting). See aLvo Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290-91 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (the limits imposed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments on government action may vary in their stringency depending on thLe
capacity in which the government is acting); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 571 (1975) (Relnquist, J., dissenting) (defending lax First
Amendment scrutiny of the refusal of a municipal theater to carry the play "Hair'
because "[hlere we deal with municipal actionl,... not prohibiting or penalizing
the expression of views in dramatic form by citizens at large, but rather managing
its municipal auditorium").
42. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (footnote omitted), quoted in
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (19S0).
43. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1315.
44. There exists no quick summary of the contribution to legal theory made
by law and economics scholars. Here, reference is only made to analyses that
measure the effect of legal rules based upon the assumption that individuals will react
in a manmer that rationally maximizes that individual's wealth.
45. The Supreme Court has affirmed this assessment. See, e.g., Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (threat
of selective tax is an effective way to burden and censor the press); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-48 (1936) (newspaper revenue tax amounts
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revocation of an economic benefit can also act as an effective
interference. 6
Some defenders of the sovereign-proprietor distinction argue that
the private market will limit the harm of proprietary functions by
providing less damaging alternatives. If an individual, for example,
wants to talk politics, he is not forced to remain a policeman; he might
choose to become a private security guard.47 It is reasoned, on the
other hand, that when the government as sovereign "attempts to
impose its will by force of law," 4 there is no alternative for the
individual - all must obey the criminal law.
This justification can be attacked on a number of grounds. First,
within the modern State, there might not be an adequate alternative
private-sector source of employment.49 In many proprietary services
furnished by the State, the government is a monopoly. As such, the
individual lacks a viable choice. 0
to censorship of the press).
46. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 434-35 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (revocation of an
organization's second-class mail privilege is "in effect a very heavy fino").
47. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892).
48. Maher, 432 U.S. at 476.
49. For further elaboration of this claim, see William W. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968):
[The] tough-minded distinction between constitutionally protected rights
[and] unprotected government privileges [mayl have been influenced by
the comparatively small economic role played by governmental units in
1892. Excluding [a plaintiff] from public employment still left open..
• a very large percentage of the available employment in the country.
But today the federal and state governments directly or indirectly control
a great proportion of the nation's employment; if one is unable to hold
public employment, his chances of personal economic succes:; are
significantly limited.
Id. at 1461-62.
50. Professor Terrell is the chief advocate of this position. See 7limothy P.
Terrell, Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property": Exploring the
Limits of Procedural Due Process, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 351, 371 (1987); Timothy
P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the
"Government As Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMOi'Y L.J. 491
(1982) [hereinafter Causes of Action as Property] (generally arguing that when
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A second criticism attacks the sovereign-proprietor distinction for
assuming that when the government allocates resources, it is a
like-kind contributor to a normally competitive market. Such an
assumption is most likely false. Professor Kreimer argues that "even
in a perfect market, a government willing to expend sufficient
tax-generated resources could effectively purchase most constitutional
rights."51 Furthermore, Kreimer notes, in competitive markets, if
only a minority of recipients need a constitutional right, the private
market will probably not find it worthwhile to provide the less
offensive alternative.52 In regard to Pennsylvania's new welfare
condition, there is clearly no effective private market remedy. No
private producer will come along and offer employment that frees the
individual to pursue a necessary, constitutionally protected remedial
education.
A third criticism recognizes that the effect and reach of
proprietary sanctions are often greater than sovereign sanctions. The
force of sovereign sanctions depend on the government finding the
violators, and then succeeding in prosecution. Proprietary sanctions,
on the other hand, automatically reach the recipient as he or she comes
to the government.53 They need not be applied with the specificity
of a criminal statute, and because their denial only triggers due
process protection once an initial interest has vested,' the use of
proprietary sanctions is often more forceful than sovereign sanctions.
With this in mind, any exercise of economic power which interferes
with constitutional interests should be subjected to the strictest review. "
government acts as a monopoly, and the weapon of choice is unavailable,
constitutional protections are most necessary).
51. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1319 n.S1.
52. Id.
53. Professor Kreimer makes this point and cautions that "the government can
tailor its inducements to forego constitutional rights so they affect only the least
popular or politically efficacious groups." Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1323.
54. See Smolla, supra note 30, at 115-16.
55. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1323-24 (noting the obvious equal protection
difficulties if a statute taxed only low income women who undergo abortions; while
a statute, achieving the same result through the imposition of a condition would
escape strict review).
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C. Positive and Negative Rights - Is Non-Action Actionable?
A third doctrine advocating deference towards allocational
sanctions rests upon the false distinction between state non-action and
action. Classic liberal political philosophy, at its minimal, interprets
the Constitution to provide negative checks against various government
actions." The State is a necessary institution to protect Locke's
principle of property, defined as "life, liberty, and estate;" yet,
maximum freedom depends upon the State's circumscription. 7
Hobbesian liberty is an "absence of . . . external impediment. "I'
Such a reading of freedom imagines membership in a constitutional
democracy where each individual is free, to the maximum extent, from
government force. Negative rights, accordingly, ensure that the
government will not interfere with individual volition.
This characterization of constitutional protection implies judicial
deference when the government simply refuses to confer a benefit
which it had no obligation to originally provide. The right holder is
still free to exercise the right, only now within a different setting, and
without government assistance.
Such a facile description of the interaction and dependence within
any political body collapses upon examination. In a Lochnerl' world
of atomized individuals with natural rights, such a description may be
accurate. Clear boundaries are violated when a state interferes with
pre-existent rights. If the right to contract, however, does not exist
56. Although wary of anarchistic extremes, Thomas Hobbes, a great
seventeenth-century English political philosopher, proclaimed that "[t] he liberties of
subjects depend on the silence of the law." THOMAS HoBBiES, LEVIATHAN 271
(Penguin Books 1968). Robert Nozick adds that "[i]ndividuals have rights, and there
are things no person or group may do to them. So strong and far reaching are these
rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state . . . may do."
ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA ix (1974).
57. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 48 (MacMillan
1952).
58. Hobbes, supra note 56, at 261.
59. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (the Supreme Court struck
down as an abridgement of the individual's liberty to contract, and therefore a
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before the state grants its exercise, then the state is forever facilitating,
and interfering, with individual choice. This makes the line between
state action and inaction difficult to draw.
For example, when a state removes a book from a school library,
is it withdrawing the optional provision of that book and thus,
performing a permissible non-action, or is it actively censoring?5
Similarly, when the government threatens to close down a Title X
health clinic if certain anti-abortion speech is not advocated, is the
state performing a valid non-action, or an offensive constitutional
interference?62
If we recognize the difficulty in establishing a clear distinction
between non-action and action, negative rights and positive,63 it
becomes clear that judicial deference predicated upon such dichotomies
is false. This is especially true, when, as Professor Hale recognizes,
60. A poignant example of the blurriness of this line is provided by Thomas
A. Spragens, Jr., who writes that "citizens owe their country for the resources, laws,
and institutions that nourish their lives, protect their liberties, and allow them to
pursue happiness and to govern themselves." THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR. THE
LIMITAIONS OF LIBERALISM, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 27, 31 (1991-92).
Additionally, Spragens reflects that "[als a North Carolinian, I can drive down the
lovely Blue Ridge Parkway that was provided for by a Depression-era Congress and
built by Works Progress Administration laborers. I can recreate in state parks that
were financed by tax payers of years long past. THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., THE
LIMITATIONS OF LIBERALISM, PART II, THE RESPONSIVE CO,.tMUNITY 43,46 (1992).
Herein, Spragens points out that state-action is ambient, and the individual benefits
from no rights that are independent of a political community.
61. See Board of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
62. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) ("Section 1003 of the Public
Health Service Act specifies that none of the federal funds appropriated under the
Act's Title X for family planning services shall be used in programs where abortion
is a method of family planning.")
63. Justice Frankfurter remarked upon the ambiguity of the distinction:
"Negative" has really been an obfuscating adjective in that it implied a
search for a distinction - non-action as against action - which dtes not
involve the real considerations on which rest Ithe ultimate issue].
'Negative' and 'affirmative,' in the context of these problems, is as
unilluminating and mischief-making a distinction as the outmoded line
between "nonfeasance" and "misfeasance."
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1939).
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"threats of not acting . . . are among the most effective weapons of
coercion. " '
It is not within the scope of this Comment to elaborate a set
determination of when an allocation permissibly or impermissibly
interferes with constitutional rights. Such an analysis turns on the
slippery question of when the allocation offers an expansion of liberty
above a baseline and when it threatens to take the individual below the
baseline. Defining the baseline, before the allocation, becomes the
rub.
65
It is important, however, to realize that the three aforementioned
rationales for judicial deference are unpersuasive. Even if the baseline
is such that the allocation cannot make the individual worse off, in
some cases, there are still reasons why a court must disallow the
government's condition. Such a case exists if the condition compels
the individual to waive a non-waivable constitutional right,
notwithstanding that she might freely choose to accept the condition.
III. WAIVABLE VERSUS NON-WAIVABLE RIGHTS -
MoRE THAN INDIVIDUAL LosSES
If a constitutional right is intended to secure the autonomy and
range of choice available to the individual, then intuitively there
appears nothing offensive about the individual choosing to waive a
protection. Such a surrender would be a further manifestation of
choice. Indeed, it seems repugnant to the constitutional value of
autonomy to paternalistically tell an individual that she cannot
voluntarily surrender her right should she decide that she would be
better off without it.
An initial reproach of this "choice" theory is based upon a
64. Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 603, 609 (1943).
65. For example, it seems implausible to argue that the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration unconstitutionally makes a scientist worse off than she
would otherwise be in her exercise of free speech when it denies her grant
application to research a glue on's weak force. Such an allocation may influence
individual choice, but it is realistically very different from denying a welfare
recipient her benefit for being a Democrat. For a detailed effort to establish such
a principled baseline, see Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1351-74.
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skepticism that true voluntary action exists. Professor C. Edwin Baker
describes the nature of voluntariness:
A person's voluntary participation means only that, given
that this type of exchange is permitted, given that
resources are distributed the way they are, given that
people's preferences have been conditioned as they have,
and given any number of other presuppositions, she views
her participation as preferable to nonparticipation. Given
the circumstances, people also generally "voluntarily"
hand over their money to a person holding a gun.'
According to this view, one must be deeply suspicious of an AFDC
recipient's voluntary waiver of an education as a condition of
accepting a benefit. Given such distribution of resources, what is the
choice? Similarly, and building upon the criticism of the distinction
between government action and inaction, 7 Professor Hale argues that
the State's maintenance of inheritance and property rights is a positive
state action which perpetuates unequal bargaining power." This
initial inequity undermines individual choice and creates an underlying
assumption of duress.69 Professor Timothy Terrell builds upon this
suspicion, and argues that it is such a lack of individual choice, most
notably occurring when the individual deals with the government as a
monopoly provider, that makes constitutional protections most
necessary. °
Even if the individual freely chooses to waive her educational
right, there exists other arguments proscribing such a condition.
Constitutional rights may provide more than an individual's veto
against particular government action. The Thirteenth Amendment7
is more than the individual's check against any system of slavery, and
the First Amendment72  does not end at the definition of
66. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected
Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 773 (1986).
67. See supra Part II.C.
68. See generally Hale, supra note 64.
69. See Hale, supra note 64, at 627-28.
70. See Terrell, Causes of Action as Property, supra note 50, at 499-500.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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censorship.7' Constitutional protections, applied through individual
cases, may function as relational rights for the benefit of the polity.
Professor Laurence Tribe writes that the non-waivable nature of
certain "relational" rights "appear to correspond to systemic
norms."' Such systemic norms are concerned with "structuring
power relationships to avoid the creation or perpetuation of' hierarchy
in which some perennially dominate others."75 Tribe recognizes that
"much of the structure of the entire Constitution, with its separation
and division of powers, can be viewed as resting on relational norms
and on the need for deliberate diffusion of power to combat the
hegemony of any single group or faction. "76
The Establishment Clause77 is a clear example of such relational
norms. Its central object is to maintain a division between secular and
religious spheres of power; neither may dominate the other. It is
obvious that these rights protecting against a commingling cannot be
waived. A church group cannot forfeit its right of separation in order
to receive an allocation from the Treasury.78 One cannol: speak of
the rights granted by the Establishment Clause as the exclusive rights
of an individual or of a group. The right to have a division between
a secular state and religious groups is a right owned by all of society.
A conception of constitutional rights as only individual vetoes against
government action incompetently vindicates such relation-focused
norms.
79
Similarly, a constitutional right may be intended to structure a
decent society. The Thirteenth Amendment's 0 prohibition against
slavery protects more than the individual's interest in being free from
73. See e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Justice Powell's
concurrence has been interpreted to award the press a right to gather news.).
74. Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 332
(1985).
75. Id. at 333.
76. Id. at 333 n.14.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. Tribe, supra note 74, at 333 n. 14.
79. Id. at 333
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XII1.
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bondage. It also represents the ideal that a decent American society
cannot tolerate slavery. Therefore, in order to protect a free society,
an individual is precluded from waiving her Thirteenth Amendment
right. Likewise, the Eighth Amendment"1 recognizes that a decent
society cannot tolerate cruel and unusual punishment. If a state
offered an inmate the choice between serving a twenty year sentence
under existent prison conditions versus serving a ten year sentence
accompanied by weekly whippings, a court would presumably bar the
prisoner's choice of the latter.' "
Economic theory also accounts for the non-waivability of certain
rights. In their seminal article, Property Rules, Liabilit. Rules, and
Inalienabilit,: One View of the Cathedral, then-Professor Guido
Calabresi and Mr. A. Douglas Malamed recognized that when a right
is waived, certain externalities, or costs to third parties, inevitably
result.' The following hypothetical illustrates the point.
When Zack produces politically progressive movies consumed by
Ed, he creates positive externalities affecting a scattered group of
Saras. These Saras benefit from the positive externalities because Ed,
who did see the movies, is more altruistic towards them. If the sum
of the value of Ed's consumption and Saras' positive externalities are
greater than the sum of Zack's cost and the negative externalities, then
society is richer with an entitlement scheme that grants Ed an
entitlement to always see Zack's movies. Assuming wealth
maximization is the goal behind choosing a particular entitlement
scheme, Ed should have this entitlement, and the Saras should benefit
from the positive externalities. This entitlement should remain Ed's
until Zack's costs and the negative externalities are greater than the
collective value of the benefit to Ed and the Saras.
If the Saras' positive externalities cannot be fully recognized or
measured, some Saras do not even know that Ed is acting kindly
towards them as a result of Zack's movies, thus, the value compiled
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
82. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 1387.
83. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, S5 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
Calabresi and Malamed discuss alienability; however, the reasoning behind their
arguments apply to waivability with equal effect.
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to keep Ed's entitlement will not properly reflect the actual benefit to
society of Ed's consumption of the movies. Furthermore, the final
benefit to society may be undervalued because there are many Saras,
and freeloader problems will result. When the benefit is undervalued,
and Zack's costs and the negative externalities become mistakenly
greater, Zack will gain the entitlement not to produce his movies, and
wealth will not be maximized. Assuming a society that desires a
scheme of entitlements that maximizes wealth, the wrong result is
reached.
In such a situation, the State must grant Ed the entitlement to
consume Zack's movies and then create an inalienability rule
prohibiting Ed from transferring this entitlement. Some might argue
that the State could institute a liability rule which would attempt to
compute the positive externalities, and use this as a price Zack must
meet in order to forego the production of his movies. If, however,
there are so many Saras that the price would always be prohibitive, it
would be more efficient to not waste the resources required to
compute Saras' benefits, but simply construct an inalienability rule.M
Barring Ed's transfer of the entitlement to consume the movie will best
maximize wealth if the immeasurable benefits to Ed and the Saras
outweigh the sum of the costs to Zack plus the negative
externalities.8 5
Similarly, the externalities resulting from the interference with
one individual's education are immeasurable and not easily
internalized. When an AFDC recipient is pulled out of her GED class
and forced to accept minimum wage employment, the dimming of her
future defies quantification. The effect upon children, health,
community and crime are all within the calculus. Furthermore, the
norm that we, as a society, value an educated, self-improving citizenry
84. Id. at 1111.
85. This discussion assumes an empirical situation where the positive
externalities are difficult to measure because of free-loader and information
problems. Of course, another set of facts may cause these same problems In regard
to negative externalities. In such a case, if the immeasurable negative externalities
would be greater than the positive externalities, the state will still need to construct
a non-waivability rule. Under this situation, however, Zack would be prohibited
from waiving his entitlement to not produce his movie.
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is seriously compromised.
Calabresi and Malamed offer a second persuasive argument
against free waivability: "self-paternalism." They analogize that, just
as Ulysses tied himself to the mast in order to avoid temptation, our
constitutional democracy created the Bill of Rights so that we will be
"prevented from yielding to momentary temptations which [in the end
are] harmful." 6 Self-paternalism assumes that over a long series of
cases, the individual knows what is best for him, and the immediate
non-waivability of constitutional rights are a manifestation of that
determination. Calabresi and Malamed, therefore, note that in some
situations, "the most efficient pie is no longer that which costless
bargains would achieve, because a person may be better off if he is
prohibited from bargaining. "I7
IV. EDUCATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONAL RIGHT
It has been argued in this Comment that a constitutional right is
non-waivable when (i) it is relational - necessary to protects other
rights, (ii) it establishes a norm which, according to constitutional
values, constitutes a decent society, or (iii) its waiver causes
immeasurable externalities. This section discusses the valence of these
qualities in regard to an individual's right to an education. It
concludes with the assertion that Pennsylvania's Up-Front work
program impermissibly interferes with a constitutional right to a
minimum education.
The constitutional status of education is unsettled. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez," Justice Powell reiterated
the sensitive stance adopted by the Supreme Court nineteen years
earlier, that "education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. " 9 Despite this recognition, Justice Powell
dismissed the claimant's equal protection challenge to Texas' system
86. Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 83, at 1113.
87. Id. at 1114. This claim mirrors the critique of voluntarinass, see supra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text. If the individual is not actualizing true choice,
then perhaps she is better off not able to choose her short-run, immediate choice.
88. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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of financing public school education.9"
Under the Texas system, the state guaranteed a minimum level of
education to each of the state's children by allocating to each school
district approximately $220 per student.9" Each district was then free
to augment its dollar per pupil allotment through the application of a
local property tax. 92  The Rodriguez claimants lived in a school
district imposing the highest property tax in the San Antonio area, yet
the district was only able to designate an additional $26 per student
above the state sustenance grant.93 The total amount, with federal
funds included, was $356 per student.94 This amount was contrasted
with that of Alamo Heights, a wealthy district, which raised an
additional $333 per student with a lower percentage property tax
rate.9" Alamo Heights was able to spend a total of $594 per
student.
9 6
Justice Powell refused to apply strict scrutiny to the plaintiff's
equal protection claim because (1) the class is "large, diverse, and
amorphous"' and (2) the state financing system does not result in an
"absolute deprivation of education."" For these two reasons,
deference was awarded, and the financing scheme stood valid.
90. Id. at 55.




95. Id. at 12-13.
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 28. The Court, in criticizing the plaintiffs' claim, states that "in
support of their charge that the system discriminates against the 'poor,' appellees
have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of
any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose income are
beneath any designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the
poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts." Id.
at 22-23.
98. Id. at 25 n.60. The Court took comfort in the fact that "[bly providing 12
years of free public-school education, and by assuring teachers, books,
transportation, and operating funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to
[gluarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all people shall have at least
an adequate program of education." Id. at 24.
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The scope of such deference, however, was carefully bound.
After reasoning its application of rationality review, the Court, in
footnote 60, hypothesized a case that "would present a far more
compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case
before [it] today. "" If the state conditioned elementary or secondary
education upon the payment of tuition by each student, "a clearly
defined class of 'poor' people would be absolutely precluded from
receiving an education."" Such a scheme, the Court implied,
would necessitate judicial intervention.
In further dicta, Justice Powell considered the claim that because
education is preservative and instrumental to other fundamental rights,
such as speech and voting, education demands special protection."'
Again, he distinguished between a "relative deprivation" and an
"absolute deprivation," stating that "[e]ven if it were conceded that
some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or
to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational
expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.""°2 The
Court implied that if an absolute deprivation resulted, the nexus test
would be appropriate, and heightened scrutiny would be required.
99. Id. at 25 n.60.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 36. This approach emphasizing a nexus bNtween the interest in
question and other constitutionally protected rights was most forcefully advocated by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rodriguez:
Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First
Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of information and
ideas. . . . [Of particular importance is the relationship between
education and the political process .... [it] is this very sort of intimate
relationship between a particular personal interest and sp-eific
constitutional guarantees that has heretofore caused the Court to attach
special significance, for purposes of equal protection analysis, to
individual interests such as procreation and the exercise of the state
franchise.
Id. at 112-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For an elaboration of Marshall's claim,
argued from moral necessity, see Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protceting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendnent, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
102. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
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Nine years later, in Plyler v. Doe, 3 the Court considered an
absolute denial of public education, and invalidated a Texas law which
required the children of illegal aliens to pay a public school
tuition. " Although the majority opinion, authored by Justice
Brennan, found that education is not a fundamental right, it was also
not deemed "merely some governmental benefit indistinguishable for
other forms of social welfare legislation. '"10  Recognizing the
relational values addressed by Professor Tribe,"0 6 the Court noted
that "education provides the basic tools by which individuals might
lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. "17 The
opinion further protected against the immeasurable externalities feared
by Calabresi and Malamed, 0s stating that "[w]e cannot ignore the
significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social
order rests. "19 While education may not be recognized as a
fundamental right, recognition of its interrelated values demand active
judicial intervention. Justice Blackmun's concurrence may have best
voiced the Court's true concern:
[C]lassifications involving the complete denial of
education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart
of equal protection values by involving the State in the
creation of permanent class distinctions. In a sense, then,
denial of education is the analogue of denial of the right
to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class
status; the latter places him at a permanent political
disadvantage. 11
The analyses of Rodriguez and Plyler substantiate the arguments
for non-waivability of certain rights and stress that education must not
be subject to allocational sanctions. If a court were to review
103. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
104. Id. at 230.
105. Id. at 221.
106. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
107. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
108. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
109. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
110. Id. at 234.
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Pennsylvania's Up-Front job program, it should recognize the
importance of education, and the interference caused by a welfare
sanction. When Pennsylvania conditions a welfare benefit upon the
waiver of one's right to a basic education, it effectively exacts a
tuition payment equal in amount to the welfare benefit. This is
precisely the situation that is cautioned against in footnote 60 of the
Rodriguez opinion."'
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has too often neglected the rule against unconstitutional
conditions. Broadly stated, "the right to continue the exercise of a
privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the
grantee's submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is
hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution. ""' In Sherbert
v. Verner,13 the Court was forced to consider whether South
Carolina could require recipients of unemployment compensation to
accept available employment regardless of any constitutional
effect.' Therein, plaintiff, an unemployed Seventh Day Adventist
for whom Saturday is the Sabbath, was discharged by her employer
because she would not work on that day." '1 She was unable to
obtain other employment because in abiding the dictates of her
religion, she did not take Saturday work."' South Carolina refused
her unemployment benefits." 7 The Supreme Court stated:
The [South Carolina Supreme Court's] ruling forces [the
recipient] to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits .... Nor may ... the
111. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. Chicago, 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931). See also Frost
& Frost Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) ('Ifa state may compel
the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may in like
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in
the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.u).
113. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
114. Id. at 400-01.
115. Id. at 399.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 401.
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statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the
ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not
appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege.' It is too late
in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege .... "I
Following Sherbert, when a court reviews such an allocational
sanction, no weight should be placed on the fact that the greater
includes the lesser, or the government acts as proprietor, or the
allocation is a mere gratuity. It must be realized that the pressure
against constitutional rights from such allocational sanctions can be as
severe as pressure from unilateral action. In regard to the
Pennsylvania's Up-Front program, compelling an individual to waive
the right to an education will (i) compromise the relational rights
which ensure effective speech and voting, and (ii) create immeasurable
externalities. Such losses should proscribe the government from
conditioning an allocation upon the waiver of a basic remedial
education.
118. Id. at 404.
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